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Abstract— The aim of this research is to analyze ethnic conflict management in Aceh (Indonesia) and Moro (Philippines) conflicts. 
The Aceh conflict was considered resolved after the signing of the Helsinki agreement, which was mediated by the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), an international NGO based in Finland, on 15 August 2005 between Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM). In the meanwhile, the Moro conflict (Philippines) is still ongoing even though a Tripoli agreement was signed and 
mediated by OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) between the Philippines’ government and Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) on 23 December 1976 as well as with MILF on 2001. The successful resolution of the Aceh conflict was due to the role played 
by various third parties such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), European Union (EU) and ASEAN and also Indonesian 
government, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), as well as the general Aceh community in upholding the peace process. The opposite 
has happened in the Moro conflict case, which even until now is still happening. These conflicts have brought a huge impact on the 
peace of its people resulting in human rights violation, higher death tolls, hampering economic productivity and the delay of 
environmental problems (Anwar, 2005). CMI in Aceh has been successful to change the ethnic conflict situation to one which can 
defeat and reduce escalation as well as sending the conflict actors on their way towards conflict resolution. Peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace building have been well-played by CMI that involved international community such as ASEAN and EU to 
arrange the conflict. Meanwhile in Moro OIC failed to bring the conflicts actors to solve their problems. The government of 
Philippines has not sturdy vision, framework and political will in solving the Moro conflict as well as OIC. 
 
Keywords— Ethnic conflict, Southeast Asian, Aceh, Moro. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the internal issues that embodies an international 
dimension and occur in a country is ethnic conflict. An 
empiric study showed that ethnic conflict is one part of 101 
armed conflicts that took place between 1989-1996, whereby 
only six percent of those conflicts are inter-country conflicts 
and the rest, about ninety four percent, occurred within a 
country. Meanwhile, out of 27 conflicts that transpired in 
1996, ones that are categorized as “major armed conflicts” 
(more than 1000 fatalities every year), 81 percent were caused 
by an identity conflict [1]. Among them are conflicts that 
occurred in Russia (Chechnya), Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and the majority of Africa. 
What‟s more devastating is the numbers of civil society that 
were sacrificed, which has risen to 80 percent compared to 
casualties during the First World War (5%) and the Second 
World War (50%). Conflicts such as these, commonly referred 
to as identity conflicts with a focus on ethnicity at its core, are 
a big threat on stability and peace, be it on the level of 
individuals, local, communal or even international peace [2].  
Since 1975, ethnic conflict has become a serious matter to 
several Southeast Asian countries. The persistent conflicts of 
this nature indicate that some of the nations in the region are 
relatively weak and problematic on the issue of legitimacy. 
Ethnic conflicts that occur in Southeast Asia region are 
characterized by armed separatism, rebellion or terrorism 
toward the main land [3]. For instance, the armed Islamic 
movement in South Philippines, South Thailand and Aceh, the 
struggle in Papua (Irian Jaya), the resistance in Timor Leste 
and the Karen ethnic conflict in Myanmar. Out of these, the 
Timor Leste cause has achieved independence through the 
enactment of referendum 1999, while in Aceh, a peace accord 
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was signed by both the Indonesian government and GAM on 
15 August 2005 [4]. 
The movements in Southeast Asia region are clashes 
between dominant groups, which have their own cultural 
values, with subordinate groups that also have their own 
religious-cultural identity.  This in turn is related to the 
formation of a national identity, which is very much 
influenced by the values held by the dominant group whereas 
the minority group tend to be ostracized. For example, the 
national identity in Thailand where the majority of its 
population are Buddhist – their language and culture as well 
as governance are so very different than that of the ethnic 
Malays, the minority in Southern Thailand whereby the group 
embraces Islam and have their own traditions, language, 
history and culture. As a result, the government of Thailand 
implemented a policy of assimilation where traditional 
customs and sharia law, which have been practiced in 
Southern Thailand, must be replaced with Thai laws and the 
same replacement for their education and administration 
systems. Up to 1977, a scheme was devised whereby a 
Muslim was prohibited to work as an officer of the 
administration. The same in South Philippines where Moro 
Muslims became an anomaly in a country dominated by 
Catholics, who are influenced by American and Spanish 
culture [5].  
Even more so the case in Aceh, Timor Leste and Papua 
(Irian Jaya) of Indonesia, which showed a domination of 
culture by the majority group against the minority. The pride 
in their history and traditions as well as loyalty to Islam are 
the factors that make the people of Aceh feel that they are 
different than other Indonesians, who they consider as 
abangan and dominated by the Java ethnic, who controls the 
bureaucracy and military. Meanwhile the people in Timor 
Leste, before gaining independence from Indonesia, and the 
Melanesians in Papua (Irian Jaya) also felt threaten by the 
Java-dominated Indonesian administration. As for Myanmar, 
the Karen ethnic and other minority groups, which have long 
been ostracized, dream of having their own nation, free from 
the domination of the Burmeses who are Buddhists. In general, 
the cases mentioned above arose due to a sense of serious 
alienation within minority groups and this is the root problem 
that originated the desire to separate and form their own 
country [5].  
These conflicts have brought about a significant impact on 
the safety of the population, which have caused violation of 
human rights, consequently insurmountable death toll, 
reducing economic productivity and causing various problems 
of the living condition [6]. The matter is worsen when conflict 
such as these persists over a long period of time. The Aceh 
conflict (Indonesia), for instance, started since 1953, the 
Pattani conflict (Thailand) erupted in the early 1900 and the 
Moro conflict around 1935 ([6], [7]).  
All sorts of efforts were made to reduce the effect of such 
ethnic conflicts, so that there will be minimal negative impact 
on the country. The efforts include, for example, instilling 
cooperative and persuasive measures through negotiations and 
dialogues, as well as other efforts ranging from offering 
autonomy packages to taking coercive measures such as the 
use of military might. Alas, these conflicts persist.  
There were not only internal efforts being made for there 
were also international endeavours to resolve the region‟s 
ethnic conflicts. For instance, the Aceh conflict resolution 
involved the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in 1999 but failed. 
Later, the Aceh conflict involved yet another international 
non-governmental organization (NGO), Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), which is based in Helsinki, Finland. The 
CMI played its role well as a mediator between the two 
conflicting actors, so well that the Indonesian government and 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) finally agreed to sign a peace 
accord on 15 August 2005. In contrast, the Moro conflict, 
although the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has 
been involved since the first negotiation on 15-23 December 
1976, which resulted in the Tripoli agreement, and involved 
third parties such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States, 
the conflict remained even until now. 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ROOT OF CONFLICT 
The factor considered to be most influential in an ethnic 
conflict is the factor of economy. Ref. [8] explained that with 
the advent of a broad economic and social injustice 
perspective such as resource, social and political distribution 
in economy, ethnic conflicts are prolonged. Not only Ref. [8], 
Ref. [9] and Ref. [10] viewed the matter from the same 
standpoint. Ref. [11] too considered that ethnic conflict in 
general is caused by a problem of the economy.  
Generally, political factor as the root of conflict embodies a 
combination of the economic and cultural factors. This 
particular factor refers to a country‟s role as the main player in 
creating the peace and harmony needed by its people. A 
conflict is an indication of the country‟s failure to play its role 
well ([12], [13] and [14]) in Ref. [6]. Although powerful, such 
a country will not be able to uphold the law and order, let 
alone provide for main services. The stagnation of economy, 
the collapse of services and the low level of population‟s 
income. This fact will finally reveal itself once the community 
is restless and should it be left to continue it will create 
disorder and eventually, cause a more serious outcome such as 
an insurgence or riot. What‟s worse is when in such situation, 
the government ignores the already „ostracized‟ groups up to 
the point where these groups emerge to put up a fight.  
As for the cultural factor as trigger of conflict, it exists due 
to the cultural differences between various groups. These 
differences tend to be inherited directly from one generation 
to the next and is prone to further differentiation. This causes 
tension and embed hostility among the culturally diverse 
groups. Opposing groups or groups that feel challenged or 
alienated will then merge and see themselves as a member of 
a common culture and so struggle together to achieve cultural 
autonomy. Conflicts that are driven by primordial ethnic force 
such as this are inevitable and difficult to overcome. Ethnicity 
is a cultural inheritance of a subconscious life, which is 
determined by one‟s origins and other bio-social determining 
factors. 
A. Aceh and Moro Conflicts 
The conflicts in Aceh and Moro, in reality, have been going 
on for a very long time, even long before Indonesia and the 
Philippines gained independence. During the colonial era, 
Aceh fought the Dutch while the Moros were preoccupied 
with the invading Spanish and Americans. But the modern 
organized form of movement in Aceh and Moro have just 
started around 1970‟s ([15], [7], [16], [10], [17] and [3-5]).  
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The task to significantly determine the cause of conflict in 
Aceh and Moro is not an easy one for the causes themselves 
are complex. The indicators no longer point to just one 
indication but it involves various factors. Furthermore, these 
factors are interrelated, so much so that there are no specific 
segments. Economic factor, political factor, socio-cultural 
factor, religious factor and historical factor are all the main 
causing factor, whereby they are all intertwined and 
accumulate to bring about dissatisfaction among the people, 
who all this while thought that their country was their 
protector and advocate of their interests (Frances Stewart in 
Ref. [6]). The people of the two territories felt alienated, 
ostracized and that they were put on the periphery level in the 
polity system. This encouraged their desires to break away 
and establish their own country. The governments of 
Indonesia and the Philippines are considered to have failed in 
playing their roles. 
1)  Aceh 
The Acheh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) 
was established in 4th December 1976, which became the 
basis of GAM‟s (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) foundation in the 
1980‟s by Tengku Hasan in Tiro – an early modern movement 
of the Aceh conflict with the purpose to separate from 
Indonesia. The GAM movement period was made to be the 
mould for the modern Aceh conflict (Askandar in Ref. [7], [18] 
and [10]). 
Actually, the armed GAM movement period would have 
not occurred if the Indonesian government of 1953, when the 
Daud Beureuh struggle erupted, were more accommodative 
and accepted the aspirations and demands of Aceh‟s people at 
the time. Jakarta‟s mistakes under the rule of Soekarno in 
overlooking the condition in Aceh at the time was in fact, 
ignoring Aceh‟s demands and thinking that the problem in 
Aceh was a trivial one, and that it can be solved using military 
power. Even though the Indonesian government were well 
aware of the contribution in history made by Aceh as an 
integral part of Indonesia‟s struggle to establish an 
independent Indonesia, they misjudged the capacity for 
confrontation by the people of Aceh. Not only that, Aceh‟s 
momentous contribution in supporting Indonesia‟s fight 
against the Dutch also demonstrated that Aceh was never 
separated from the united Indonesia.  
The turn over of Indonesia to Soeharto‟s rule in 1967 were 
also apparently unfruitful in bringing about significant 
changes in terms of improving the condition in Aceh. In fact, 
the situation worsen due to the implementation of Daerah 
Operasi Militer (DOM) or Military Operation Territory in 
1988. This repressive approach ala New Order did not elevate 
the problem, instead it verified that the people of Aceh are 
indeed at the periphery level and that they are being alienated. 
This natural resource rich territory could not even benefit 
from its own riches because they were channelled to Jakarta 
and to a certain extent, some were benefited by local 
corrupted Aceh officers. The fall of the New Order in 1998 
further strengthened GAM as a movement organization, which 
gained extensive support from the community of Aceh.  
GAM‟s existence and platform became more and more real. 
This made the Indonesian government restless and they began 
to pay more attention by offering autonomous options, fair 
monetary allocations, ending DOM and other persuasive 
methods of gaining Aceh‟s support. 
The Aceh conflict, which is known through the existence of 
GAM as a symbol of struggle, up until before the signing of 
the Helsinki treaty on 15 August 2005, can not only be seen in 
terms of religion but also in terms of history, socio-culture, 
political interests, nationalism and economy. All of these 
factors are interrelated, making it more complex and difficult 
to untangle. Referring to only one factor as the main cause can 
no longer be used as an approach. Apart from that, other 
factors that also affected the Aceh conflict is the hatred felt by 
the people of Aceh towards the Java domination, the absurdly 
high level of corruption and forays as well as poverty, the high 
level of unemployment and also the lag felt by Aceh‟s 
community in the long period of a century [3-5]. 
2)  Moro 
The foundation of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
in mid-1971 as a result of the Jabidah tragedy in Corregidor 
on 18 March 1968, which took the lives of 28 Muslims whom 
the majority was of the Tausug ethnic from Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi, triggered the initial momentum of the Moro‟s modern 
movement to separate from the Philippines as an independent 
race. Historically speaking, this was a reflection of the Moros‟ 
true identity that were not actually a part of the Philippines. 
To the Moros, their sovereignty was accomplished long before 
the country, Philippines was formed. So it is not surprising 
that even until today, the call for independence is still the 
priority to several factions of the movement group that arose 
after MNLF such as MILF, Abu Sayyaf and other small 
groups.   
The conflict that occurred in Moro is able to exist due to 
the suppression, exploitation, disregard and discrimination 
experienced by the Moros for a very long time, as long as they 
have been with the Philippines. The Moros‟ suffering is 
related to economic exclusion and poverty, political 
dominance, restricted identity including religion, territory and 
culture, as well as the threat to peace and actions taken by the 
government of Philippines itself in not paying due attention to 
the Moros, which instigated the armed movement of the 
Moros [19]. Also, Muslim viewed that internally, the Moro 
struggle is not because of an internal disagreement among the 
Moros themselves such as a struggle for power among the 
Moro leaders nor is it caused by the wish of younger 
generation Moro to seize power from their predecessors. 
In addition, another issue that has also become an essential 
basis for their desire for independence is the high death toll. 
The Moro conflict has sacrificed over 60,000 souls, and that is 
only between 1969 to 1976, plus 54,000 more injured and 
around 350,00 families losing their homes. Data from 1977 to 
2008 indicates a significant increase. From 1975 to 2002, not 
including data from 2003 to 2008, the economic loss has 
reached a staggering 5 to 10 trillion pesos every year [20]. 
III. THE SUCCESS IN ACEH AND THE FAILURE IN MORO 
A. The Success in Aceh 
The signing of the Helsinki agreement on 15 August 2005 
between the government of Indonesia and separatist group, 
GAM was not only caused by both sides wanting to make 
peace but there were also many other factors that came into 
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play. The following analysis attempts to illustrate what ever 
factors that supported and influenced the success of peace in 
Aceh, which were mediated by the Crisis Management 
Initiative lead by Marti Ahtisari. 
1)  The Government of Indonesia 
The administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Jusuf Kalla succeeded in bringing peace to Aceh after the 
signing of the Helsinki Agreement on 15 August 2005. The 
success cannot be separated from the political will of 
Indonesian government that genuinely wanted to solve the 
conflict. When compared to previous administrations, the 
accommodative and cooperative stance demonstrated by 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyona‟s and Jusuf Kalla‟s 
administrations were more significant and effective. A serious 
approach was taken as well as a clear platform and vision 
observable of their management. The measures taken by the 
administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf 
Kalla lead to the internationalization of Aceh‟s conflict 
management, whereby they invited a third party, CMI to help 
and mediate the negotiation between the Indonesian 
government and separatist group, GAM. The method was 
indeed not a new approach for previously, during the 
administration of Abdulrahman Wahid, a similar measure of 
inviting a third party, the Henry Dunant Centre was 
implemented. But in the end, it fells through. 
Internationalization of Aceh‟s problems was also done by the 
Indonesian government when Aceh was hit by the tsunami. 
Aid from the international community was received directly as 
well as indirectly. The negotiations were not trouble-free. The 
Indonesian government wittingly showed its preparedness to 
fulfil all of GAM‟s demands, which seemed very risky 
because there will be consequences from having a country 
within a country, be it in the organization of Aceh‟s local 
government or political participation or even the economy as a 
whole. Another measure taken by the government of 
Indonesia was to carry out the provision of the Memorandum 
of Understanding, which specified the retreat of military 
forces from Aceh. The Indonesian government‟s seriousness 
was proven by the gradual withdrawal of 31,681 military and 
police officers from Aceh by January 2006. The numbers is 
progressively increasing even as we speak. This is truly a 
commitment that have not been seen before from previous 
administrations, which relied more on military approach in 
managing the conflict in Aceh. 
2)  Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 
The separatist group, GAM, not very much different from 
the Indonesian government, wittingly showed their 
preparedness to negotiate with the later to manage the conflict. 
On the whole, GAM had always followed the government‟s 
lead in discussing the question at hand. GAM was involved in 
each and every process of the negotiation with the Indonesian 
government. It was on 4 December 1976 that GAM, under the 
leadership of Hasan, in Tiro declared its desire for 
independence that is to separate from Indonesian governance. 
The resolution was made due to the injustice suffered by the 
people of Aceh brought about by Indonesian government. 
This shows a dialectic of thinking whereby if justice and 
peace prevail in Aceh, then the insurgence and conflict would 
cease in Aceh. GAM‟s desire for peace was also apparent in 
its willingness to carry out all of the provisions in the MoU of 
the Helsinki Agreement such as the disarmament of GAM. As 
of January, 1018 weaponries have been handed over by GAM 
to the Aceh Monitoring Mission for disposal. GAM is also 
prepared to no longer carry out disturbances that can worsen 
the situation. 
3)  Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) 
The recognition of CMI as a third party, trusted by both 
sides in disagreement, for the management of Aceh conflict 
showed that the CMI, lead by Marti Ahtisari, is indeed a 
world class NGO that is capable and competent in conflict 
management. CMI has been tested as having a reputation in 
handling conflicts of various conflicting regions of the world 
such as the case in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. CMI‟s experience 
of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building  in conflict 
management of various nations and its neutral disposition as a 
third party attracted the government of Indonesia and 
separatist group GAM to invite CMI as their mediator. Some 
of the considerations made to assess CMI‟s qualification in 
managing the conflict in Aceh, which succeeded in bridging 
the peace process were: professionalism in deciding the 
measures for the peace process, by developing a sense of 
commitment between the two conflicting sides with a slogan 
“nothing is agreed until everything agreed”; and standards that 
relies on multi-track diplomacy that invited the European 
Union for funding as well as ASEAN in performing the 
various tasks of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. 
4)  Tsunami 
A tsunami which devastated Aceh and caused more than 
200,000 fatalities with immeasurable loss of property, is 
another factor that brought success to the peace process in 
Aceh. The tsunami became a shared basis that made possible 
the Indonesian government and GAM to begin the peace 
negotiations. Both sides demonstrated sympathy for the 
victims of tsunami. Both sides realized how helping tsunami 
victims is far more important than prolonging a conflict. 
Furthermore, the international community was also present in 
Aceh for humanitarian reasons, which made both sides aware 
that they did not want to go to war. 
B. The Failure in Moro 
In contrast to Aceh, the Moro conflict is still ongoing. 
Despite the Tripoli agreement being signed by both parties 
that is the government of Philippines and separatist group 
MNLF in 1976, and the government of Philippines and MILF 
in 2001, which was mediated by the Organization of Islamic 
Conference. As with the success in Aceh, the failure of 
resolving the Moro conflict is also attributed to various factors. 
1)  The Government of the Philippines 
Galtung and Horowitz (in Ref. [21]) revealed that a country, 
where ethnic conflict occur, is incapable of being a neutral 
arbiter but instead it becomes a part of the conflicting parties. 
For that reason, it is very impractical to rely on the role of that 
country to manage its own ethnic conflict. This statement 
describes how sometimes a country, where ethnic conflict 
occur, can turn a conflict into an arena for power struggle 
driven by economic or even political factor. It is obvious that 
the government is insincere in managing the conflict 
considering that peace is so hard to attain. It seems that the 
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government is half-heartedly handling the conflict. The 
persisting conflict in Moro is caused by at least three things, 
namely: weak political will from both conflicting sides, 
absence of a good framework and ambiguous vision of the 
conflict management by the Philippines‟ government. Weak 
political will from the government of the Philippines has long 
been a feature, ever since Ferdinand Marcos‟ administration. 
Even so, after signing the new agreement, the Philippines 
government often resort to military approach to control the 
outcome of the agreement. What happened was that it 
triggered new tensions between the two sides. Persuasiveness 
was non-existent in the part of the government and the same 
was also true for the implementation of mutually consented 
programmes contained in the agreement. Take for instance the 
formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) during the administration of Corazon C. Aquino in 
1990, which ended with suspicion of Nur Misuari and his 
arrest. Later in 1996, another agreement was made with 
MNLF under the administration of Ramos but that too was 
doomed to failure. Subsequently, the Philippines government 
began negotiations with the new MILF since the 
administration of Joseph Estrada and now, Arroyo. A very 
disturbing event that unfolded was when Joseph Estrada 
launched an all-out war against MILF in March 2000. It 
consequently made Arroyo‟s job harder. 
2)  Rebel Groups 
The continuance of the conflict in Moro is also due to the 
economy-oriented separatist group. In another word, there are 
indications that the separatist group, especially their leaders, 
are purposely prolonging the conflict with the Philippines 
government, turning it into a platform to gain roll-over funds 
from the government and the support of the international 
community. An example of this is the case of Nur Misuari of 
the ARMM, who was considered to have misused 
development funds for the southern region under ARMM‟s 
authority. The development of South Philippines, a region 
under the control of ARMM, was not implemented as it 
should. In fact, it tended to be marginalized. The many 
number of separatist groups in Moro is another reason as to 
why the Moro conflict is difficult to resolve. The interests of 
each separatist group are different. The negotiation between 
the Philippines government and MNLF, for example, was 
settled but then along came other separatist groups such as the 
MILF and Abu Sayyaf, and other groups like the Rajah 
Solaiman Movement and Abu Sofia Group. Not forgetting the 
Cordilleras, another separatist set, in the northern region of the 
Philippines. 
3)  Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
The size of OIC clearly cannot assure a good mediation. 
Many times over, the OIC acted as mediator between 
separatist groups, MNLF and also MILF, and the government 
of Philippines but to no avail. Peace was not restored. There 
are many factors as to why the OIC is an organization 
incapable of resolving the conflict in the Philippines. Those 
factors include the fact that the OIC is a governmental 
international organization, whereby its agendas only facilitate 
the conflict between its members. Even if called to resolve a 
conflict, such as the conflict in Moro, OIC‟s role will 
ultimately be the opposite of maximal. Its official status 
makes OIC burdened with rigid diplomatic protocols, which 
indeed have sensitive effects on any progress of mediation. A 
governmental international body such as the OIC is limited by 
time. The OIC also failed to invite and take full advantage of 
the potential of its members to control the peace process in 
Moro. After the signing of the peace treaty, there were no 
peace building controlled by a third party. Consequently, 
leaving the treaty to be interpreted by the conflicting parties 
themselves.  
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